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1. Introduction 
Economics is a difficult science. Models are abstractions from the real world, yet they 
are supposed to inform those using them about what is going on. Making matters 
worse, there are many models of different varieties which come to differing 
conclusions. The practitioner is then confronted with the task to choose the right 
model that fits the specific research topic and provides the most “correct” while still 
simplified view of reality. 
One marked example of this clash between theory and practice continues to be the 
monetary policy of China. The People’s Bank of China (PBoC) fixed the exchange 
rate of the yuan to the US dollar in the middle of the 1990s. What represented a 50% 
depreciation in 1995, was upheld at 8.28 Yuan Renminbi (RMB) to the dollar for over 
ten years — in spite of currency turmoil and depreciation among China’s 
neighbouring countries during the Asian crisis in 1997/98. After 2005 the RMB 
exchange rate was only allowed to appreciate on tiptoes at 5% a year to the dollar 
before the Great Financial Crisis broke out in 2008. Until today practitioners are 
wondering how long the fixed exchange rate regime will be sustainable.  
Textbook Mundell–Fleming theory tells us that in a fixed exchange rate regime with 
perfect or semi-perfect capital mobility the money supply is turned into an 
endogenous variable. The central bank is required to provide domestic money or 
foreign money depending on whether there is an excess demand for domestic 
currency from trade surpluses or capital inflows (FDI) or vice versa. The former puts 
upward pressure, the latter downward pressure on the domestic currency. This 
pressure can be alleviated by the central bank by either selling or buying foreign 
currency, thus expanding or contracting the money supply respectively. The 
managed exchange rate regime run by the PBoC has been in operation for more 
than a decade and a half now by virtue of which the Chinese have created the 
world’s largest foreign reserves valued at US$3.800 billion (about €3.000 bn) by mid-
2012. With the dollar peg still in place and a weakly negative correlation between the 
growth of foreign exchange reserves and the money supply, it seems a different 
theory is needed to explain the persistence of the Chinese monetary regime. 
Chinese monetary policy – from theory to practice 
 
4 
A contender to the standard theory view is the so-called ‚compensation thesis’ as 
proposed by Lavoie and Wang (2012). According to this view, a central bank is able 
to offset a rise in the money supply by different operations on its balance sheet other 
than inverted open market operations. Therefore, the acquisition of net foreign assets 
through an export-led growth strategy will not lead to an increase in the money 
supply and will consequently leave the price level unaltered. Changes in the price 
level depend rather on credit than on money, which develops independently from the 
central bank’s compensation of net foreign asset growth within the banking system. 
In the remainder of this article we will explain the two theories, examine their 
assumptions and evaluate them in the light of empirical data. We find that the 
textbook view is not supported by Chinese data. On the other hand, our examinations 
of the balance sheets substantiate the compensation thesis. 
2. The theory of exchange rate stabilization 
The two theoretical frameworks, while dealing with the same issue, take very 
different angles. Whereas the Mundell–Fleming model imagines a simple central 
bank engaged in exchanging foreign money into domestic money, the compensation 
thesis assumes that the central bank has more options and is trying to insulate the 
growth of credit from disturbances arising from the net acquisition of foreign assets. 
Also, the Mundell–Fleming model assumes an asset-based banking system whereas 
the compensation thesis is usually based on an overdraft banking system. In such a 
system, banks do not settle inter-bank payments by exchanging money or 
government bonds, but through their overdraft account with the central bank. Banks 
are indebted vis-à-vis the central bank at all times; the banking system in continental 
Europe is characterised by this system (Godley and Lavoie 2004, 4). The 
endogenous creation of credit within the banking system is supposed to be the driver 
of changes in the price level, whereas in the Mundell-Fleming model this role is 
reserved for central bank money. This different view of the conduct of central bank 
policy is what makes the difference. In the following, the two models are introduced 
and examined with respect to assumptions, causality and the underlying mechanism 
that connects the balance of payments with the price level. 
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2.1 The Mundell–Fleming model 
The Mundell–Fleming model (1962) is based on the canonical IS–LM model and 
adds international capital flows by introducing a balance of payments locus. It is 
therefore sometimes referred to as the IS–LM–BP model. Its most general version 
assumes capital to be perfectly mobile or at least semi-perfectly mobile, but the 
model can also feature closed capital accounts. We use the open capital account 
version in which different interest rates in countries equilibrate capital flows. Table 1 
below shows the balance sheet of a central bank, in our case the People’s Bank of 
China, according to the Mundell–Fleming model view.  
Table 1 Balance sheet of the PBoC (Mundell–Fleming) 
Assets  Liabilities 
(Net) Foreign reserves ↑ (c)  Currency in circulation ↓↑ (b/d) 
Claims on domestic government ↓ (a)  Bank reserve balances 
 
The central bank holds two types of assets, foreign reserves and domestic 
government securities. The liability side consists of currency in circulation and bank 
reserves (deposits by banks from reserve requirements). Together they constitute the 
money supply.  
If, say, the central bank wants to contract the money supply by selling domestic 
government securities (a) for domestic currency to the public, it thereby reduces 
currency in circulation (b). According to the Mundell–Fleming model, an increase in 
the interest rate following a contraction in the money supply will trigger foreign capital 
flows into the country. Higher interest rates in one country create an excess demand 
for domestic currency causing its exchange rate to appreciate. If a central bank like 
the PBoC wants to keep the exchange rate stable, it needs to increase the domestic 
money supply (currency in circulation) when foreign currency holders want to 
exchange their foreign into domestic currency. To this end, the PBoC sells yuan by 
“printing” money (d) and buys foreign currency, e.g. US dollars (c). Since currency in 
circulation plus bank reserves together equal money supply, their increase puts 
downward pressure on the interest rate. Eventually both money supply and the 
interest rate are back to where they started, with the notable difference of foreign 
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assets and claims on domestic government having changed on the asset side of the 
central bank’s balance sheet. 
Monetary policy is hence neutralized by international capital flows. A central bank 
operating fixed exchange rates and semi-open capital accounts therefore neither has 
discretionary control over the interest rate nor over the money supply. This 
constitutes “Mundell’s trilemma” of being able to target only two of the three desirable 
attributes open capital accounts, an independent monetary policy and fixed exchange 
rates at the same time (Mundell 1960). 
2.2 The compensation thesis 
The compensation thesis states that foreign capital flows are compensated by 
changes in the central bank’s balance sheet so that the money supply is not affected. 
The balance sheet of the PBoC below shows that a rise of foreign reserves (a) may 
be compensated through at least three different balance sheet operations (b, c, d): 
Table 2 Balance sheet of the PBoC (compensation thesis, Fulwiler 2010: 47) 
Assets  Liabilities (and capital) 
(Net) Foreign reserves ↑ (a)  Currency in circulation 
Claims on domestic government   Bank reserve balances 
Claims on domestic banks ↓ (b)  Government deposits ↑ (c) 
Other assets   Central bank bills ↑ (d) 
  Central bank capital/equity 
 
Before going into more detail, it should be noted that this balance sheet is longer 
than the one assumed in the Mundell–Fleming model. With claims on domestic 
banks there is now a third asset on the balance sheet of the central bank. The reason 
is that the banking system is assumed to be of the so-called overdraft variety. Banks 
are indebted toward the central bank because they are able to get loans directly from 
the central bank, providing them with liquidity for interbank payments settlements, 
depending on certain rules. 
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On the liabilities side, there are three additional entries. The government holds 
deposits at the central bank, which it can spend at will, constituting a liability for the 
central bank. The central bank is able to issue bills (and bonds) in order to mop up 
what it regards as excess money in the banking system. It can thereby influence 
liquidity and thus affect the amount of funding available in the banking system. In 
addition, the central bank has equity or own capital. 
Now, according to the compensation thesis, capital inflows from abroad will not 
necessarily increase the money supply. In the presence of a fixed exchange rate 
target, inflowing foreign exchange will increase reserve holdings (a) by central bank 
acquisition of, e.g., US dollars as above. However, there are now three different 
routes by which this increase can be compensated so that the money supply remains 
unaffected by the capital inflow. First, claims on domestic banks can be reduced. As 
banks are indebted to the central bank, an increase in the domestic money supply as 
the result of an exchange of foreign for domestic money by the central bank may 
induce domestic banks to reduce their loans drawn from the central bank (b). Since 
loans from the central bank are costly to banks and newly created domestic currency 
has been created, banks can reduce central bank loans and acquire currency in 
order to reduce their funding costs. Alternatively, the central bank itself may impose a 
reduction of the amount of loans to domestic banks. 
A second option for the central bank is to increase the amount of deposits the 
government holds with the central bank. The last option is the emission of central 
bank bills, a concept known as sterilization. In these cases the money supply is 
initially increased, leaving banks with cash to invest which they prefer to store in safe 
interest-bearing assets rather than hold in cash. If banks use their reserves to buy 
safe central bank bills, the money supply is being reduced again. Alternatively, the 
banking sector could be coerced into taking newly created central bank bills onto its 
balance sheet (financial repression). 
In consequence, all three options above result in the money supply not being 
changed by an increase of foreign reserves. This is clearly a different result to the 
one in the Mundell–Fleming model where the central bank cannot autonomously 
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determine the money supply since it cannot insulate itself from capital inflows. If the 
compensation thesis is applicable, the central bank has gained room to conduct 
monetary policy compared to Mundell–Fleming being able to change the money 
supply and/or interest rates. At the same time, a partly open capital account and a 
fixed exchange rate could be maintained.   
In the next section, we will turn to some empirical evidence from China for the two 
competing views. First we scrutinize the assumptions of both models, then we look at 
the connection between foreign reserves and money supply and finally we turn to the 
conduct of monetary policy in the case of the compensation thesis and the use of 
quantitative instruments like reserve requirements and the loan-to-deposit ratio. 
3. Chinese monetary policy in practice 
China is the world’s largest exporter of manufactured goods measured in US dollars, 
having overtaken Germany as recently as 2009. Chinese exports are not matched by 
imports of equal magnitude so that China has been running an average trade 
balance surplus of 3.6% of GDP since 2000. Additionally, being subject to 
considerable capital inflows from foreign direct investment (FDI), China’s current 
account surplus during the first decade of the millennium stood at an annual average 
of 5.1% of GDP. 
3.1 A collision of theory and practice 
This is the background against which the People’s Bank of China is conducting its 
monetary policy. One of the drivers of its export performance has been the stability of 
its exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar, which has been kept at 8.28 yuan to the 
dollar between 1995 and mid-2005. Between 2005 and 2008 and in 2010 and 2011, 
the People’s Bank of China let the yuan-dollar rate appreciate by 5% a year 
amounting to a cumulative 24% nominal appreciation to 6.30 yuan since June 2005. 
This appreciation partly remedied or even overcompensated the overvaluation of the 
yuan a as result of the deflationary period before 2003 (Korhonen and Ritola 2009). 
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Figure 1 visualizes the development of monetary aggregates and net foreign assets. 
In the presence of surplus demand for Chinese currency from a positive net trade 
balance, we would expect both to move in lockstep if new money was created to buy 
dollars. Yet, for the three monetary aggregates published by the PBoC1, we see a 
different behaviour. While currency in circulation (M0) stays almost constant at just 
below 15% of GDP, we see a moderate increase for money (M1) by 20 percentage 
points and a stronger increase for “Money & Quasi-Money” (M2) by 55 percentage 
points since 1998 (see Table 4 for exact figures).  
Figure 1 Chineses net foreign assets, domestic credit and money supply (2000–12) 
 
The most striking development is the one of net foreign assets (NFA). While standing 
just above 15% of GDP in 2000, NFA grew fast throughout the 2000s reaching 
almost 54% by the end of 2010. This development represents the well-known rise of 
China to become the largest foreign holder of US Treasury securities officially worth 
over US$1,149 bn in July 2012.2 The build-up of US bond holdings of US$1,090 bn 
                                            
1 The PBoC publishes the “Balance sheet of the monetary authority” and “Money Supply” statistics on 
its website, available as annual overviews at http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/english/984/index.html.  
2 US Treasury, Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities, available at:  
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Documents/mfhhis01.txt 
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— the equivalent of 55% of all current account surpluses during this time — is the 
‘buy-side’ of the theoretical exposition laid out in the theory part. In order to stabilize 
the yuan exchange rate to the US dollar, the PBoC bought US assets of which US 
government securities constitute the majority. The ‘sell-side’ of monetary policy, 
required to offset the monetary expansion when exchanging yuan for dollars, is more 
contentious. In Figure 1 we simply do not see any of the three monetary aggregates 
move in line with net foreign assets. While M0 and M1 do not show sufficient 
variation to account for monetary expansion, M2 has a different time pattern 
altogether, especially in the second half of the 2000s. The divergence becomes more 
obvious when looking at rates of growth as presented in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 The (non-)relation between net foreign asset and money supply growth 
 
Figure 2 displays year-on-year changes of the three money supply aggregates and 
net foreign assets as a share of GDP. The latter share grows at two-digit rates 
between 2002 and 2009 while money supply grows between 2000 and 2004 and 
after 2009 but is nil or negative in between. If the Mundell–Fleming model were the 
appropriate tool for interpreting Chinese monetary policy, we should see changes in 
net foreign assets and money supply behave in a similar manner both in terms of 
quantity and timing. 
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The correlation of the growth rates of the monetary aggregates shows no such 
relation. Between 2000 and 2011 all rates of change of the monetary aggregates 
have a small, but stable negative correlation with the growth in net foreign assets 
with –42%, –41% and –32% for M0 to M2 respectively. Since the PBoC achieves 
stabilization of the exchange rate the way it does and thereby accumulates 
international reserves from offsetting foreign capital inflows, there need to be other 
channels at work through which compensation takes place. The compensation thesis 
view offers three competing explanations. 
3.2 Five phases of pragmatic central banking 
It may be conceivable, and there is considerable indication in the literature (Geiger 
2006, He and Pauwels 2008, Reade and Volz 2011), that the People’s Bank of China 
has in the past had a rather flexible policy stance adjusting to circumstances at need. 
We have therefore come up with an interpretation of the uses of monetary policy 
instruments and the targets of these changes which can be divided into the five 
phases shown in Figure 3 and summarised in Table 3.  
The first phase is characterised by a stable exchange rate and a mixture of low 
inflation and mild deflation until mid-2004 with growing net foreign assets largely 
absorbed by increases in the money supply (phase I) and (repo) open market 
operations. As Green (2005, 6) reports, this was put to an end when the central bank 
ran out of bonds. Therefore, in 2003 the use of government bonds was substituted by 
the emission of sterilization bonds, which effectively compensate for the monetary 
expansion by withdrawing money from the public (phase II). Selling sterilization 
bonds was continued on a large scale starting from scratch in 2003 and reaching 
17% of GDP in 2007 when bond emissions seized. In the meantime, the PBoC let the 
exchange rate appreciate at a rate of 5% per year after June 2005. From 2006 
onwards, inflation took off despite decreases in the money supply (phase III).  
Chinese monetary policy – from theory to practice 
 
12 
Figure 3 Five phases of the monetary policy stance of the PBoC (2001–2011) 
 
As a new policy response, reserve requirements were increased from 7.5% of bank 
deposits in 2006 by successively lifting the ratio to 17.5% at the time of the Lehman 
crash in September 2008. During this time, the equivalent of 6.5% of GDP or 
US$220 bn have been absorbed by the PBoC from the banking system by sharply 
raising the ratio of required reserves deposited with the central bank (see Table 4 
and Table 5).  
Table 3 Summary of policy instruments use and targets of the PBoC (2000–2011) 
 Targets & priority Instruments  
 
Inflation 
Exchange 
rate appr. 
Money 
supply 
Foreign 
assets 
Reserve 
requirements 
Bond 
issuance 
 
2000–2004 + o ++ + + + I 
2004–2006 o + - ++ o ++ II 
2006–2008 + ++ o ++ ++ ++ III 
2008–2010 -- o - + - o IV 
2010– + + + o + -- V 
++/+ representing a (strong) increase, o stability and -/-- a (strong) decrease 
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In the Great Financial Crisis, the PBoC accompanied its fiscal stimulus measures of 
countering export and growth slowdowns by re-pegging the exchange rate. Monetary 
policy was reverted to the pre-2004 stance of accumulating net foreign assets without 
offsetting them by sterilization (phase IV). Once the domestic and global economies 
started to normalize, the PBoC restarted its small-scale appreciation (suspended in 
2012). A reduction of outstanding sterilization bonds freed previously locked liquidity 
and a mixture of money supply and reserve deposits growth characterized phase V. 
The policy stance of the PBoC — if it is at all characterizable by outsiders without 
inside knowledge of the policy targets of the highly secretive Chinese central bank  
— seems mainly oriented towards curbing inflation and allowing modest exchange 
rate appreciation while keeping a lid on money supply growth. This permits the 
current Chinese business model of promoting growth and employment through 
exports accompanied by large-scale domestic infrastructure investment to continue. 
The asymmetry in the PBoC’s balance sheet, which is heavily skewed to net foreign 
assets, may nonetheless cause problems in the future. Valuation effects from 
exchange rate changes or lower US bond prices, if interest rates pick up again, may 
cause considerable disruption to the asset side of the PBoC’s balance sheet. 
The People’s Bank of China maintained a pragmatic approach to its monetary policy 
over the past 12 years. With periods of a fixed exchange rate and a managed peg 
alternating and inflationary pressure varying, the Chinese central bank has used all 
policy instruments at its hands. The pure money supply perspective of central 
banking from Mundell–Fleming can be refuted in the case of China. Instead, the 
multitude of policy instruments put forward by the compensation thesis view seems 
warranted, allowing China to circumvent Mundell’s impossible trinity by keeping 
control over domestic money supply. The cost of this practice, however, is 
considerable financial repression of domestic markets. 
3.3 Practical problems of inflation control: loans vs. deposits 
The Mundell-Fleming model is a not a good gauge of Chinese reality in the past 
decade nor is the money supply driven by inflows and outflows of foreign capital. The 
central bank rather insulates capital flows from the money supply by absorbing them 
on its balance sheet, to which end there are several monetary policy instruments 
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available to policy makers. In the case of China, the standard tool of monetary policy 
is not the interest rate, as in most developed economies, but the ratio of required 
reserves (RRR). The use of this policy instrument is the subject of much academic 
debate. Fullwiler (2008, 2) declares that “reserve balances do not ‘fund’ loans or 
otherwise aid the creation of outside money”. Outside money creation, used here 
somewhat irregularly for money created outside the central bank – which is normally 
called inside money by convention –, means that the money multiplier is not a causal 
determinant but may rather constitute an ex-post property of credit creation within the 
banking system. We agree with Fullwiler’s statement up to a point. As we understand 
it, the RRR does play a substantial role in money creation in China. 
Banks in China are bound by two institutional barriers from increasing their lending. 
The first barrier is a legal ceiling of a 75% loans-to-deposit ratio (LDR). Article 39 of 
the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Commerical Banks (PBC 1995) states: 
“When granting a loan, commercial banks shall abide by the following 
provisions on the control of assets-liabilities ratios: (1) the capital adequacy 
ratio may not be lower than 8 percent; (2) the ratio of the outstanding of loans 
to the outstanding of deposits may not exceed 75 percent; (3) the ratio of the 
balance of floating assets to the balance of floating liabilities may not be 
lower than 25 percent; (4) the ratio of the outstanding of loans granted to the 
same borrower to the balance of the capital of the commercial bank may not 
exceed 10 percent; and (5) other provisions of the People's Bank of China 
concerning the control of assest-liabilities ratios. If, after the implementation 
of this Law, the assets-liabilities ratios of a commercial bank established prior 
to the implementation of this Law are found not in conformity with the 
provisions of the preceding paragraph, the bank shall make it conform to the 
provisions of the preceding paragraph within a certain time limit. The specific 
measures therefor shall be formulated by the State Council.“ 
The 75% loans-to-deposit ratio was scrapped as a legal barrier in July 2012 but 
continues to be monitored closely by the China Banking Regulatory Commission 
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(CBRC). The second is the reserve requirement ratio. We believe that the two are 
connected and that this connection is crucial in understanding how the PBoC can 
influence the amount of credit created within the banking system. An assumption 
required for this construct to work is sufficient demand for loans. Given a sufficiently 
high demand for loans in normal times, a rise in the RRR diminishes the share of 
deposits that banks can translate into loans. Since a constant amount of loans 
outstanding is now funded by a smaller share of free liquidity on the asset side of a 
banks’ balance sheets, these would need to reduce their loan portfolio to meet the 
reserve and LDR requirements. 
Now, as everywhere, rules are there to warrant exceptions. The rules in China are as 
follows according to a Japanese Ministry of Finance analysis (IIMA 2004, 26): 
“In HVPS [High-Value Payment System], financial institutions must cancel 
payment instructions in the queue by 6:00 p.m., or credit them via HVPS after 
raising funds from other branches. When an overdraft is not compensated by 
6:00 p.m., the unpaid payment instruction in HVPS will be compulsorily 
returned to the sending bank. If payment is not completed in BEPS [Bulk-Entry 
Payment System] or LCHS [regional payment systems], PBC will apply a 
penalty interest rate to financial institutions with overdrafts, and extend an 
overnight credit.” 
A bank in overdraft will lose money from lending activities if its marginal credit margin 
is below the penalty rate. It would then be in the interest of the bank to reduce its 
loan portfolio in order not to end up short on reserves for the central bank. As the 
end-of-quarter deadline to deliver the reserves to the PBoC approaches, the 
interbank market interest rate can be expected to spike upwards if the total amount of 
reserves in the system is too low. More precisely, the interest rate will approach the 
penalty rate on overdrafts. This is just the mechanism Fullwiler (2010, 4) described: 
reserves do not create loans, they are rather the required ex-post financing condition 
validating all granted loans. 
Figure 4 shows the Shanghai Inter-Bank Offered Rate (SHIBOR). Interest rates are 
relatively volatile compared to interbank markets in OECD countries because the 
PBoC is not using open market operations to affect the interest rate. Instead it 
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employs purely quantitative measures like reserve requirements and the loan-to-
deposit ratio. When a bank has difficulty in providing sufficient reserves to meet 
reserve requirements in the time window set by the PBoC, the bank borrows the 
remainder on the interbank market forcing interest rates up. After the reserve window 
is closed at the end of a quarter, rates fall back and only rise again towards the end 
of the next reserve settlement period. The effect is only noticeable at short maturities 
which is exactly what Figure 4 is showing in high fluctuations for maturities below one 
month while longer maturities are more stable. 
Figure 4 SHIBOR, maturities from overnight to one year (2006–2012) 
 
When the world economy experienced a slowdown in economic growth after the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the spikes in interest rates 
ceased. Banks shrank their loan portfolio and subsequently needed less reserves, 
which effectively ended the struggle for scarce reserves. This meant no more 
bidding-up of the inter-bank interest rate. Additionally, the PBoC may have provided 
help by offering cheaper overdrafts, which is unknown. In this period, however, the 
RRR was lowered and the actual loan-to-deposit ratio fell from its legal ceiling of 75% 
to 65% within two months in 2009 (see Figure 5). In addition, Figure 2 showed 
monetary aggregates to have fallen during that time.  
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Figure 5 Domestic credit over reserve deposits ratio and reserve requirements 
 
Note: Ratio calculated as domestic credit times reserve requirement ratio over  
PBoC deposits of financial institutions 
The loan-to-deposit ratio of 75% has been a cornerstone to China’s banking system 
for 17 years. Figure 5 shows that it was not surpassed until 2009. Despite a record-
high reserve ratio of 21.5% (lowered to 20% in mid-2012), the actual loan-to-deposit 
level has been on the rise reaching almost 90% in late 2011. Shang Fulin, chairman 
of the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) noted that a stunning 64 
commercial banks where surpassing their average daily loan-to-deposit ratio of 75% 
at the end of September 2011. An interesting phenomenon is that the interest rates 
for short-term inter-banking lending in Figure 4 feature drastic increases in the last 
days of a quarter. When the quarterly check is over, the interest rate decreases 
again. 
From September 2008 onwards the two monetary policy instruments RRR and loan-
to-deposit ratio seem to have been ineffective, at least in the expansionary direction. 
If loan demand from firms is insufficient, the ability to create more loans alone does 
not make banks lend out more. Despite a lowering of the reserve ratio in Q3 2008, 
growth of the monetary aggregates turned around only in mid-2009 when economic 
conditions normalized and loan demand picked up as interest rate rise in Figure 4 
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shows. Instead of lowering the RRR further, on November 15th 2008 the Chinese 
government revealed a 1.2 trn yuan stimulus package creating the lacking loan 
demand itself.  
If monetary policy had control over the economy, why would the Chinese government 
turn to a fiscal stimulus? It seems certain that the PBoC understood that loan 
demand was fallling, thus the required assumption for effective monetary policy was 
not fulfilled anymore. Just as the US and the euro zone entered a liquidity trap, the 
previously so successfully conducted Chinese monetary policy of absorbing capital 
inflows and insulating net foreign asset growth from spilling over into domestic money 
supply by using quantiative policy instruments stopped working in an environment of 
negative growth rates and a lack of loan demand. 
4. Policy implications 
We have put two theories – the Mundell–Fleming model and the compensation thesis 
– to a test by examining assumptions and predictions of both regarding foreign 
reserves and money supply. We have found evidence pointing towards the validity of 
the compensation thesis while the mechanism suggested by the Mundell–Fleming 
model is rejected. Money supply and foreign reserves do not correlate, and monetary 
policy can indeed be conducted by the central bank using required reserve ratios. 
While rejecting an automatism from foreign exchange accumulation to money supply 
growth we want to stress that the compensation on the central banks balance sheet 
is not without effect. Building up huge reserves of foreign reserves and neutralizing 
them by emitting central bank bills creates a currency and also a maturity mismatch. 
A realignment of the fixed exchange rate, for whatever reason, would incur large 
losses on the PBoC balance sheet which is composed mainly of assets denominated 
in US dollars and yuan denominated liabilities. The abundant supply of US dollars 
might also lead to changes in the behaviour of the private or public sectors when 
their risk perception of the vulnerability from currency appreciation rises.  
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Another related consequence of the fixed exchange rate regime is the central bank’s 
risk of incurring valuation losses on its portfolio. Foreign reserves in the form of US 
government securities pay only little interest given the Fed’s protracted expansionary 
monetary policy. When compensating US dollar inflows by selling central bank bills, 
the overall net present value of the operation may be negative. Whether these losses 
hurt the PBoC depends on their size and the willingness of the Chinese public to 
incur them, as did Germany and Japan in the 1970s. One way to avoid losses would 
be to shift them on less visible balance sheets, which is exactly what the PBoC has 
been doing. Forcing central bank bills with low interest rates onto banks’ balance 
sheets led to what Shaw (1973) and McKinnon (1973) call ‘financial repression’. 
The increase in total assets and liabilities in the financial system increases the 
fragility in the financial structure and distorts incentives. Low real returns to capital 
favours credit-driven investment over consumption and, perhaps somewhat later, 
speculation over real investment. Whatever the channels will be, it seems that capital 
inflows to China do not automatically lead to a change in the money supply. The 
compensation thesis is correct in assuming that the central bank has some 
instruments at its disposal to shift the burden of adjustment into different directions. 
This leaves quite a large role for monetary policy which Mundell’s impossible trinity 
denies. 
Chinese monetary policy as conducted by the PBoC can be understood from a 
compensation thesis point of view. The PBoC insulated inflows of foreign capital from 
the monetary base and focused on the loan aggregate by using the RRR in 
conjunction with a 75% loan-to-deposit ratio. We find no evidence that the latter is in 
fact a policy instrument and the legal ceiling was consequently converted into a 
monitoring variable in July 2012 by the Chinese banking regulator. In the aftermath of 
the Lehman bankruptcy the use of the RRRs turned out to be ineffective and was 
replaced by fiscal policy while the world economy was grinding to a halt. By now, 
monetary policy is back as the preferred instrument for economic policy control in 
China but an historically high loan-to-deposit ratio despite a record-high reserve ratio 
of over 20% leaves little room for non-loan bank activities casting clouds of doubt 
over the sustainability of the quantity-driven approach to Chinese monetary policy.  
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Statistical appendix 
Table 4 Overview of financial statistics of the PBoC 
	  
Gross	  
domestic	  
product	  
Current	  
account	  	  
Net	  
foreign	  
assets	  
Bank	  
reserve	  
deposits	  
Base	  
money	  
M0	  
Money	  
M1	  
(Quasi-­‐)	  
Money	  
M2	  
Domestic	  
credit	  
1998	   84402.28	   3.09	   	   	   13.27	   46.15	   123.81	   	  
1999	   89677.05	   1.95	   	   	   15.00	   51.11	   133.70	   	  
2000	   99214.55	   1.71	   15.71	   16.15	   14.77	   53.57	   135.68	   122.16	  
2001	   109655.17	   1.31	   18.11	   15.58	   14.31	   54.60	   144.36	   118.18	  
2002	   120332.69	   2.44	   19.32	   15.90	   14.36	   58.91	   153.75	   140.36	  
2003	   135822.8	   2.80	   22.93	   16.61	   14.54	   61.93	   162.88	   148.19	  
2004	   159878.3	   3.55	   29.37	   22.31	   13.43	   60.03	   158.38	   137.62	  
2005	   184937.4	   5.94	   34.25	   20.76	   12.99	   58.01	   161.54	   135.41	  
2006	   216314.4	   8.58	   39.65	   22.40	   12.52	   58.26	   159.76	   133.48	  
2007	   265810.3	   10.13	   46.96	   25.74	   11.41	   57.38	   151.76	   127.78	  
2008	   314045.4	   9.12	   51.76	   29.33	   10.90	   52.93	   151.31	   120.80	  
2009	   340902.82	   5.23	   54.37	   30.05	   11.22	   64.53	   177.83	   145.08	  
2010	   401512.8	   5.15	   53.65	   34.04	   11.12	   66.40	   180.78	   146.28	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, PboC; end of year values as percentages of Chinese 
GDP (in 100m yuan), missing values not reported before 2000. 
Table 5 Overview of real and monetary growth rates of the PBoC 
	  
Real	  
GDP	  
CPI	  
inflation	  
Bond	  
issues	  
Reserves	  
deposits	  
Base	  
money	  
M0	  
Money	  
M1	  
(Quasi-­‐)	  
Money	  
M2	  
Domestic	  
credit	  
Yuan	  
appreci
ation	  
rate	  
Reserve	  
require
ments	  
ratio	  
1999	   7.3	   -­‐1.01	   	   	   12.25	   10.21	   7.68	   	   	   6.00	  
2000	   6.8	   1.49	   	   	   -­‐1.58	   4.69	   1.47	   	   -­‐0.01	   6.00	  
2001	   8.2	   -­‐0.30	   	   6.47	   -­‐3.17	   1.91	   6.21	   6.69	   0.00	   6.00	  
2002	   7.0	   -­‐0.43	   	   11.33	   0.36	   7.59	   6.30	   26.50	   0.00	   6.00	  
2003	   8.35	   3.16	   71.19	   16.44	   1.24	   5.01	   5.77	   17.53	   0.00	   7.00	  
2004	   9.0	   2.28	   129.6	   45.83	   -­‐7.94	   -­‐3.12	   -­‐2.80	   8.90	   -­‐0.01	   7.50	  
2005	   9.7	   1.57	   60.54	   7.34	   -­‐3.28	   -­‐3.42	   1.98	   12.95	   -­‐2.45	   7.50	  
2006	   10.0	   2.77	   38.21	   23.29	   -­‐3.76	   0.44	   -­‐1.11	   14.24	   -­‐4.26	   9.00	  
2007	   11.4	   6.37	   14.76	   34.49	   -­‐9.23	   -­‐1.53	   -­‐5.13	   16.24	   -­‐8.97	   14.50	  
2008	   14.6	   1.25	   28.38	   29.73	   -­‐4.63	   -­‐8.08	   -­‐0.30	   11.06	   -­‐3.47	   16.00	  
2009	   8.2	   1.69	   -­‐8.46	   10.62	   2.92	   19.83	   16.15	   26.52	   -­‐0.09	   15.50	  
2010	   9.2	   4.47	   -­‐3.80	   28.84	   -­‐0.93	   2.86	   1.65	   17.19	   -­‐2.62	   18.50	  
2011	   9.8	   6.37	   -­‐54.40	   32.57	   -­‐2.86	   -­‐2.99	   -­‐1.52	   15.37	   -­‐5.10	   21.50	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, PboC; year-on-year growth rates of end of year values, 
missing values not reported before 2000, 2011 values are end of Q2, reserve requirements ratio in 
percent of deposits of deposit holding institutions (banks). 
